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Abstract
Is numerical mimicry a third way of establishing truth?
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Empiricism lies at the heart of the scientific method. It
seeks to understand the world through experiment and expe-
rience. This cycle of formulating and testing falsifiable hy-
potheses has amalgamated with a modern form of rationalism—
the use of reasoning, mathematics and logic to understand na-
ture. These schools of thought are couched in centuries of his-
tory and, until recently, remained largely distinct. Proponents
of empiricism include the eighteenth-century Scottish philoso-
pher, David Hume, who believed in a subjective, sensory-based
perception of the world. Rationalism is the (mistaken) belief
that the use of reasoning alone is sufficient to understand the
natural world, without any recourse to experiment. Its roots
may be traced to the Greek philosophers, Aristotle, Plato and
Pythagoras; its more modern proponents include Kant, Leibniz
and Descartes.
A clear example of both practices at work is in the field of
astronomy and astrophysics. Astronomers discover, catalogue,
and attempt to make sense of the night sky using powerful tele-
scopes. Astrophysicists mull over theoretical ideas, form hy-
potheses, make predictions for what one expects to observe,
and attempt to discover organizing principles unifying astro-
nomical phenomena. Frequently, researchers are practitioners
of both subdisciplines.
Problems in astrophysics—and physics, in general—may
often be rendered tractable by concentrating on the character-
istic length, time, or velocity scales of interest. When trying to
understand water as a fluid, it is useful to treat it as a continuous
medium rather than as an enormous collection of molecules,
because it makes it vastly easier to visualize (and compute) its
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macroscopic behavior. Although the Earth is evolving on ge-
ological time scales, its global climate is essentially invariant
from one day to the next (and hence the difficulty in explaining
the urgency of climate change to the public). The planets of the
Solar System do not orbit a static Sun, as it performs a ponder-
ous wobble about its center of mass due to their collective grav-
itational tug, but it is often sufficient to visualize it as being so.
The Milankovitch cycles cause the eccentricity and obliquity of
the Earths orbit to evolve over hundreds of thousands of years,
but they are essentially constant over a human lifetime. This
separation of scales strips a problem down to its bare essence,
allowing one to gain insight into the salient physics at the scale
of interest.
Multiscale problems, on the other hand, do not lend them-
selves to such simplification. Small disturbances in a system
might show up as big effects across a myriad of sizes and time
scales. Structures on very large scales “talk” to features on very
small scales and vice versa. For example, a grand challenge in
astrophysics is planet formation—to predict the diversity of ex-
oplanets forming around a star, starting from a primordial cloud
of gas and dust. Planet formation is an inherently multiscale
problem: Uncertainties on microscopic scales, such as how tur-
bulence and the seed particles of dust grains are created, hinder
our ability to predict the outcome on celestial scales. Many
“real-life” problems in biology, chemistry, physics, and the at-
mospheric and climate sciences are multiscale.
By necessity, a third, modern way of testing and establish-
ing scientific truth—in addition to theory and experiment—is
via simulations, the use of (often large) computers to mimic
nature. It is a synthetic universe in a computer. One states
an equation (or several) describing the physical system being
studied, programs it into a computer, and marches the system
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forward in space and time. If all of the relevant physical laws
are faithfully captured, then one ends up with an emulation—
a perfect, The Matrix-like replication of the physical world in
virtual reality.
In astronomy and astrophysics, this third way has come into
its own, largely due to the unique status of astronomy as an ex-
perimental science. Unlike other, laboratory-based disciplines,
astronomers may not exert full control over their experiments—
one simply cannot rearrange objects in the sky. Astronomical
phenomena often encode information about a subpopulation of
a class of objects at a very specific moment in their evolution.
To understand the entire population of a class of objects across
cosmic time requires large computer simulations of their for-
mation and evolution. Examples of different classes of objects
include exoplanets, stars, black holes, galaxies and even clus-
ters of galaxies. The hope is that these simulations lead to “big
picture” understanding that unifies seemingly unrelated astro-
nomical phenomena.
During the 1940s through the 1980s, the late, distinguished
Princeton astrophysicist Martin Schwarzschild was one of the
first to use simulations to gain insights into astronomy, har-
nessing them to understand the evolution of stars and galaxies.
Schwarzschild realized that the physical processes governing
stellar structure are nonlinear and not amenable to analytical
(“pencil and paper”) solution since it requires an understanding
of the physics of nuclear burning, while galaxies are hardly per-
fect spheres, and proceeded to investigate them using numerical
solutions generated by large computers (at that time).
Both lines of inquiry have since blossomed into respected
and full-fledged subdisciplines in astrophysics. Nowadays, an
astrophysicist is as likely to be found puzzling over the engi-
neering of complex computer code as he or she is to be found
fiddling with mathematical equations on paper (or chalkboard).
From the 1990s to the present, the approach of using com-
puter simulations for testing hypotheses flourished. As technol-
ogy advanced, astronomical datasets became richer, motivating
the need for more detailed theoretical predictions and interpre-
tations. Computers became more prevalent and faster, along-
side rapid advances in the algorithmic techniques developed by
computational science. Inexorably, the calculations produced
by large simulations evolved to resemble experimental datasets
in size, detail and complexity. Computational astrophysicists
now come in three variants: engineers to build the code, re-
searchers to formulate hypotheses and design numerical exper-
iments, and yet others to process and interpret the resulting
massive output. Supercomputing centers function almost like
astronomical observatories. For better or worse, this third way
of establishing scientific truth appears to be here to stay.
In a series of lunchtime conversations with astrophysicist
Piet Hut of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, I dis-
covered that we were both concerned about the implications of
these ever-expanding simulations. Computational astrophysics
has adopted some of the terminology and jargon traditionally
associated with the experimental sciences. Simulations may le-
gitimately be regarded as numerical experiments, along with the
assumptions, caveats, and limitations associated with any tradi-
tional, laboratory-based experiment. Simulated results are of-
ten described as being “empirical”, a term usually reserved for
natural phenomena rather than numerical mimicries of nature.
Simulated data are referred to as “data sets”, seemingly placing
them on an equal footing with observed natural phenomena.
The Millennium Simulation Project, designed and executed
by the Max Planck Institute for Astrophysics in Munich, Ger-
many, provides a pioneering example of such an approach. It
is a massive simulation of a universe in a box, elucidating the
very fabric of the cosmos. The datasets generated by these sim-
ulations are so widely used that entire workshops are organized
around them. Mimicry has supplanted astronomical data.
It is not far-fetched to say that all theoretical studies of na-
ture are approximations. There is no single equation that de-
scribes all physical phenomena in the universe—and even if
we could write one down in principle, solving it would be pro-
hibitive, if not downright impossible. The equations we study
as theorists are merely approximations of nature. Schro¨dinger’s
equation describes the quantum world in the absence of grav-
ity. The Navier-Stokes equation is a macroscopic description
of fluids. Newton’s equation describes gravity accurately under
terrestrial conditions, superceded only by Einstein’s equations
under less familiar conditions.
To understand the orbital motion of exoplanets around dis-
tant stars, it is mostly sufficient to only consider Newtonian
gravity. To understand the appearance of these exoplanets at-
mospheres requires approximating them as fluids and under-
standing the macrosopic manifestations of the quantum me-
chanical properties of the individual molecules (their absorption
and scattering properties). Each of these governing equations is
based on a law of Nature—the conservation of mass, energy or
momentum (or some other generalized, more abstract quantity
such as potential vorticity). One selects the appropriate gov-
erning equation of nature and solves it in the relevant physical
regimes, thus creating a model. A model captures a limited set
of salient properties of a physical system. The term itself is
widely abused—a “model” that is not based on a law of nature
has little right to be called one.
A fundamental limitation of any simulation is that there is
a practical limit to how finely one may slice space and time
in a computer (the “resolution”), such that the simulation com-
pletes within a reasonable amount of time (say, within the du-
ration of one’s Ph.D thesis). For multiscale problems, there
will always be phenomena operating on scales smaller than the
size of ones simulation pixel. Astrophysicists term these “sub-
grid physics”—literally physics happening below the grid of the
simulation. This difficulty of simulating phenomena from mi-
croscopic to macroscopic scales, across many, many orders of
magnitude in size, is known as a “dynamic range” problem.
As computers become more powerful, one may always run
simulations that explore a greater range of sizes and discretize
space and time ever more finely, but in multiscale problems
there will always be unresolved subgrid phenomena. Astro-
physics and climate science appear to share this nightmare. In
simulating the formation of galaxies, the birth, evolution, and
death of stars are determining the global appearance of these
synthetic galaxies themselves. Galaxies typically span tens of
thousands of light years across, whereas stars operate on scales
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that are roughly a hundred billion times smaller.
The climate of Earth appears to be significantly influenced
by clouds, which both heat and cool the atmosphere. On scales
of tens to hundreds of kilometers, it is the imperfect cancel-
lation between these two effects that matters. To get the de-
tails of this cancellation correct, we need to understand how the
clouds formed and how their emergent properties developed,
which ultimately requires an intimate understanding of how the
microscopic seed particles of clouds were first created (“nucle-
ation”). Remarkably, uncertainties about cloud formation on
such fine scales are hindering our ability to predict whether a
given exoplanet is potentially habitable. Cloud formation re-
mains a largely unsolved puzzle across several scientific disci-
plines. In both examples, it remains challenging to simulate the
entire range of phenomena, both due to the prohibitive amount
of computing time needed and our incomplete understanding of
the physics involved on smaller scales.
Another legitimate concern is the use of simulations as “black
boxes” to churn out results and generate seductive graphics or
movies without deeply questioning the assumptions involved.
For example, simulations involving the Navier-Stokes equation
often assume a “Newtonian fluid”—one that retains no memory
of what was done to it in the past and offers more resistance or
friction when layers of it are forced to slide past one another.
Newtonian fluids are a plausible starting point for a rich variety
of simulations, ranging from planetary atmospheres to accretion
disks around black holes. Curiously, several common fluids are
non-Newtonian. Dough is an example of a fluid with a memory
of its past states, while ketchup tends to become less viscous
when it is increasingly deformed. Attempting to simulate these
fluids using a Newtonian assumption is an exercise in futility.
To use a simulation as a laboratory, one has to understand
how to break it—otherwise, one may mistake an artifact as a
result. In approximating continua as being discrete, one has to
pay multiple penalties. Spurious oscillations or enhanced vis-
cosity that are artifacts of this procedure may easily be misinter-
preted as being physically meaningful. Simply put, when one
slices up space and time in a simulation, it may introduce fea-
tures that look like real waves or make the fluid more viscous
in an artificial way. The conservation of mass, momentum, and
energy—cornerstones of theoretical physics—may no longer be
taken for granted in a simulation and depends on the numerical
scheme being employed, even if the governing equation con-
serves all of these quantities perfectly on paper.
Despite these concerns, a culture of “bigger, better, faster”
is prevailing. It is not uncommon to hear discussions centered
on how one can make one’s code more complex and run even
faster on a mind-boggling number of computing cores. It is
almost as if gathering exponentially increasing amounts of in-
formation will automatically translate into knowledge, that the
simulated system attains self-awareness. As terabytes upon ter-
abytes of information are being churned out by ever more mas-
sive simulations, the gulf between information and knowledge
is widening. We appear to be missing a set of guiding principles—
a “meta-computational astrophysics”, for lack of a better term.
Questions for metacomputational astrophysics include: Is
scientific truth more robustly represented by the simplest or the
most complex model? (Many would say simplest, but this view
is not universally accepted.) How may we judge when a simula-
tion has successfully approximated reality in some way? (The
visual inspection of a simulated image of, say, a galaxy ver-
sus one obtained with a telescope is sentimentally satisfying,
but objectively unsatisfactory.) When is “bigger, better, faster”
enough? Does one obtain an ever better physical answer by
simply ramping up the computational complexity?
An alternative approach to “bigger, better, faster” is to con-
struct a “model hierarchy”—a suite of models of varying com-
plexity that develops understanding in steps, allowing each phys-
ical effect to be isolated. Model hierarchies are standard prac-
tice in climate science. Focused models of microprocesses (tur-
bulence, cloud formation, etc) buttress global simulations of
how the atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere, cryosphere and
lithosphere interact.
With increasingly complex simulations, there are also ques-
tions surrounding the practice of science. It is not unheard of to
encounter published papers in astrophysics where insufficient
information is provided for the reproduction of simulated re-
sults. Frequently, the computer codes used to perform these
simulations are proprietary and complex enough that it would
take years and the dedicated efforts of a research team to com-
pletely recreate them. Scientific truth is monopolized by a few
and dictated to the rest. Is it still science if the results are not
readily reproducible? (Admittedly, “readily” has a subjective
meaning.)
There are also research groups or individuals who take the
more modern approach of making their codes open source. This
has the tremendous advantage that the task of scrutinizing, test-
ing, validating, and debugging the code no longer rests upon
the shoulders of an individual, but of the entire community.
Some individuals believe that this amounts to giving away trade
secrets, but there are notable examples of researchers whose
careers have blossomed partly because of influential computer
codes they have made freely available.
A pioneer in this regard is Sverre Aarseth, a Cambridge as-
trophysicist who wrote and freely gave away codes that com-
puted the evolution of astronomical objects (planets, stars, etc)
under the influence of gravity (“N-body” codes). Jim Stone of
Princeton and Romain Teyssier of Zu¨rich are known for author-
ing a series of codes that solve the equations of magnetized flu-
ids and they have been used to study a wide variety of problems
in astrophysics. Volker Springel of Heidelberg made his mark
via the Millenium Simulation Project. In all of these cases, the
publicly available computer codes became influential because
other researchers incorporated them into their repertoire and
they eventually became part of the astrophysical lexicon.
A related issue is falsifiability. If a physical system is per-
fectly understood, it comes with no freedom of specifying model
inputs. Technically, astrophysicists term these “free param-
eters”. Quantifying how the sodium atom absorbs light pro-
vides a fine example—it is a triumph of quantum physics that
such a calculation requires no free parameters. In large-scale
simulations, there are always physical aspects that are poorly
or incompletely understood and need to be mimicked by ap-
proximate models that specify free parameters. Often, these
Heng: Scientific Proof in the Age of Simulations (in American Scientist) 4
pseudo-models are not based on fundamental laws of physics,
but consist of ad hoc functions calibrated on experimental data
or smaller-scale simulations, which may not be valid in all phys-
ical regimes.
An example is the planetary boundary layer on Earth, which
arises from the friction between the atmospheric flow and the
terrestrial surface and is an integral part of the climatic energy
budget. The exact thickness of the planetary boundary layer
depends on the nature of the surface—whether it is an urban
area, grasslands, or ocean matters. Such complexity cannot be
directly and feasibly computed in a large-scale climate simula-
tion. Hence, one needs experimentally measured prescriptions
for the thickness of this layer as inputs for the simulation. To
unabashedly apply these prescriptions to other planets (or exo-
planets) is to stand on thin ice. Worryingly, there is an emerging
sub-community of researchers switching over to exoplanet sci-
ence, from the Earth sciences, who are bringing with them such
Earth-centric approaches.
To form large-scale galaxies, one needs prescriptions for
star formation and how dying stars (supernovae) feed energy
back into their environments. To simulate the climate, one
needs prescriptions for turbulence and precipitation. Such pre-
scriptions often employ a slew of free parameters that are ei-
ther inadequately informed by data or involve poorly known
physics. As the number of free parameters in a simulation in-
crease, so does the diversity and variety of simulated results. In
the most extreme limit, the simulation predicts everything—it
is consistent with every outcome anticipated. A quote attributed
to John von Neumann describes it best, “With four parameters,
I can fit an elephant and with five I can make him wiggle his
trunk.” Inattention to falsifiability has been chided by Wolf-
gang Pauli, who remarked, “It is not only incorrect, it is not
even wrong.” (“Das ist nicht nur nicht richtig, es ist nicht ein-
mal falsch.”) A simulation that cannot be falsified can hardly be
considered science.
Simulations as a third way of establishing scientific truth
are here to stay. The challenge is for the astrophysical commu-
nity to wield them as transparent, reproducible tools, thereby
placing them on an equally credible footing with theory and
experiment.
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